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Abstract
Mechanism design provides a framework to solve distributed optimization problems
in systems of self-interested agents. The combinatorial auction is one such problem,
in which there is a set of discrete items to allocate to agents. Unfortunately, recent
results suggest that it is impossible to implement reasonable approximations without
losing robustness to manipulation. Furthermore, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
mechanism is known to be vulnerable to manipulation when agents can bid under
multiple false names. In this paper we relax incentive constraints and require only
that useful manipulation be NP-hard. We prove that any tractable approximation
algorithm can be made to produce a hard-to-manipulate (VCG-based) mechanism,
providing a useful counterpoint to these negative results. We also show that false-
name bid manipulation in the VCG is NP-hard.
∗Harvard College, ssanghvi@post.harvard.edu
†Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, parkes@eecs.harvard.edu
11 Introduction
The problem of mechanism design is that of designing an eﬀective system-wide solution to
a decentralized optimization problem where the inputs are the private information of self-
interested agents. The goal is a mechanism that, through a particular means for choosing
an outcome and payments, can induce agents to communicate their information truthfully
and can implement a desirable social choice function.
A widely studied problem in mechanism design is the combinatorial auction problem.
This is the problem of eﬃciently auctioning a basket of diﬀerent goods to agents who may
have nonlinear preferences over various subsets. One of the most attractive solutions to this
problem is the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA), which is a special case of the general
class of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (or VCG) mechanisms. The GVA has the advantages of
being strategyproof (that is, it is the dominant strategy for each player to report its true
preferences) and allocatively eﬃcient (it maximizes the value of the allocation over all agents)
(Jackson 2000).
Several problems arise, however. First, since maximizing allocative eﬃciency is NP-
hard in this setting, the GVA is necessarily intractable. Approximation algorithms must
be used. Unfortunately, recent results show that introducing a tractable approximation
algorithm into the GVA must either leave the mechanism manipulable or “unreasonable”
in its approximation properties.1 A second drawback is the susceptibility of the GVA to
sophisticated types of manipulation, like that of false-name-bids, whereby agents bid under
multiple identities. In fact, it is provably impossible to provide an auction that is both
false-name-proof and allocatively eﬃcient (Yokoo, Sakurai, and Matsubara 2002).
In this paper, we consider how these negative results change when the agents them-
selves are limited in their computational power. By relaxing strategyproofness to a type of
“hardness-of-manipulation,” one might hope to move the diﬃculty of the problem from the
mechanism to the manipulators, thereby achieving reasonable and tractable mechanisms.
We adopt a notion of hard-to-manipulate that states that the problem of computing a useful
non-truthful bid given knowledge of the bids from other agents is NP-hard.
Speciﬁcally, this paper presents two new results. First, we provide suﬃcient conditions on
the approximation algorithm of a VCG-based combinatorial auction that make manipulation
NP-hard. The result holds even if all bidders are single-minded—that is, they only value a
single bundle of goods at a certain value. We demonstrate that any approximation algorithm
can be modiﬁed to satisfy these properties with no loss in eﬃciency and only a linear-time
slowdown. Second, we prove that false-name bid manipulation in the GVA is NP-hard.
This implies that we can sidestep the negative result ruling out eﬃciency and false-name-
proofness, within our model of hard-to-manipulate mechanisms.
The guarantee that our notion of hard-to-manipulate provides to a mechanism designer
1Recent results due to Lavi et al. (Lavi, Mu’alem, and Nisan 2003) suggest a general negative result,
even looking beyond the VCG at alternative payment schemes.
2is substantially weaker than that of strategyproofness, given its worst-case nature. However,
the demands of practicality, in light of substantial negative results make it at least a necessary
and somewhat comforting recourse. We postpone further discussion of our results to the end
of the paper.
2 Related Work
The literature of computational mechanism design generally focuses on how bounded-rationality
is a problem: for agents, it leads to a push for mechanisms with simple-to-compute dominant
strategy equilibria (Varian 1995) and a consideration of steps to mitigate unnecessary eﬀort
in valuation and bidding (Parkes 2003); for the mechanism infrastructure, it leads to a push
for mechanisms that are tractable to implement (Nisan and Ronen 2001).
Our approach is to view bounded-rationality as a potential boon to the mechanism. The
literature concerned with using bounded rationality in mechanism design in this way is
fairly limited. The most directly similar approach is taken by Conitzer and Sandholm (2002,
2003), who prove hardness of manipulation results for common voting protocols, building
on earlier work (Bartholdi 1989). There are also characterization results in the literature;
for instance Archer et. al. (2003) give a precise characterization of the group manipulation
opportunities available when using the marginal cost mechanism for multicast cost sharing.
It is a straightforward corollary of their characterization that such group manipulation is
easy under the model that we have chosen.
Other authors have adopted satisﬁcing notions, such as those of -strategyproofness
(Kothari, Parkes, and Suri 2004) and truth-revelation as a best-response with high prob-
ability whatever the bids of other agents (Archer, Papadimitriou, Talwar, and Tardos 2003).
Indeed, there is a tradition of -equilibrium models in the economic literature (Schummer
2002). Another approach is to provide an explicit model of the bounded-knowledge or
bounded-reasoning process available to an agent and design speciﬁc mechanisms to try to
mitigate this constraints and still achieve useful outcomes (Nisan and Ronen 2000, Parkes
2003).
Finally, it is worth mentioning that our approach closely parallels that of another in
computer science, cryptography. Whereas cryptography allows an agent to hide information
by making it too hard for other agents to force a revelation, we hope to force an agent to
reveal information by making it too hard for that same agent to avoid revelation. Just as in
cryptography, we desire a certain “one-way” function wherein the mechanism’s computation
is easy but any attempt to backsolve the computation (to manipulate the result) will meet
with diﬃculty.
33 Preliminaries
Our approach for mechanism design with bounded-rational agents is to exhibit a mechanism
for which the agent manipulation problem is an NP-hard problem. We will consider the
agent manipulation problem to be that of, given an agent i and true type vector θ for all
agents, determining a new strategy θ0
i such that agent i’s overall utility from the allocation
and transfers improves by , for some ﬁxed, small .
This deﬁnition is in a few ways stronger than it could be. By requiring the agents to
manipulate only to improve their utility by , we are showing the stronger result that any
manipulation is hard, not, for instance, that manipulating optimally is hard. Moreover, we
give the agent access to the true type declarations of the other agents. Conceivably one
could prove hardness of manipulation results by depending on the uncertainty an agent faces
in the potential types of the other agents (Conitzer and Sandholm 2002). This will lead to
the problem, however, of modeling the partial knowledge that an agent might have (since
assuming the agent knows nothing will yield a very tenuous guarantee). We sidestep this
problem by assuming the agent knows exactly what the other agents will report—showing
that even then the manipulation is hard gives an only stronger result.
3.1 VCG-based mechanisms
Assume we have a set of bidders, N = {1,...,n}, and a universe of goods G = {1,...,m}.
Each agent i privately observes a type θi, specifying the bidder’s valuation for diﬀerent
subsets of the universe. Speciﬁcally, given a type θi and some S ⊆ G, we can deﬁne a
valuation function v(S,θi) → R. We make two assumptions about the bidders’ valuation
functions:
• Free Disposal: If S ⊆ T, then v(S,θi) ≤ v(T,θi)
• Normalization: v(∅,θi) = 0
We let θ denote the type vector (θ1,...,θn) of all agents.
Deﬁnition 1 We deﬁne a combinatorial auction as a pair of functions (k(·),t(·)), known
as the allocation and transfer functions, respectively, with the following constraints:
• k(θ) = (k1(θ),...,kn(θ)), where each ki(θ) ⊆ G, and for any i,j, i 6= j, ki(θ)∩kj(θ) =
∅.
• t(θ) = (t1(θ),...,tn(θ)) where each ti(θ) ∈ R
The agents declare types ˆ θi (not necessarily equal to true types θi) and from this are
computed the allocations ki(ˆ θ) and monetary payments (to the mechanism) ti(ˆ θ). The
utility of each player ui is then deﬁned to be v(ki(ˆ θ),θi) − ti(ˆ θ) (quasilinearity). Let θ−i =
(θ1,...,θi−1,θi+1,θn) denote the types without agent i.
4Deﬁnition 2 The Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) is deﬁned as follows:
• k(θ) = k∗(θ) is chosen to maximize
P
i∈N v(ki(θ),θi)
• t(θ) is deﬁned with each ti(θ) =
P
j6=i v(k∗
j(θ−i),θj) −
P
j6=i v(k∗
j(θ),θj)
where k∗(θ−i) maximizes
P
j6=i v(kj(θ−i),θj).
The GVA has several important properties, primary among them being strategyproofness
and allocative eﬃciency:
• The GVA is strategyproof in the sense that it is the dominant strategy of each agent
to report its true type θi. That is, v(k∗
i(ˆ θi,θ−i),θi)−ti(ˆ θi,θ−i) is maximized for ˆ θi = θi,
for all θi and all θ−i.
• The GVA is allocatively eﬃcient in the sense that the allocation maximizes the total
value across agents.
Unfortunately, we also have the following:
Proposition 1 (Rothkopf, Pekec, and Harstad 1998) Computing the optimal allocation in
the combinatorial auction problem is NP-hard.
One approach to combating this problem is to use a suboptimal allocation function within
a VCG payment scheme.
Deﬁnition 3 The class of VCG-based auctions are those where ti(θ) =
P
j6=i v(kj(θ−i),θj)− P
j6=i v(kj(θ),θj), where k can be any feasible allocation function.
Clearly, a VCG-based auction using the optimal allocation k∗ is the GVA. The potential
price of using suboptimal algorithms is strategyproofness. Nisan and Ronen (2000) show
that this price is usually paid:
Theorem 1 (Nisan and Ronen 2000) A VCG-based mechanism with a reasonable2 and
tractable allocation algorithm will not be strategyproof.
3.2 False-name bids
False-name bids are a form of manipulation in which a bidder is able to assume multiple
identities, submit diﬀerent bids under each of those identities, and possibly beneﬁt from the
result (Yokoo, Sakurai, and Matsubara 2002).
Within the GVA, we allow false-name bid manipulation by using the following:
2An allocation algorithm is reasonable if, whenever only one agent values a particular item, that item is
assigned to it.
5Deﬁnition 4 We allow each agent i to submit multiple bids {ˆ θi} = { ˆ θi1,... ˆ θik} to the
mechanism, which then operates on the bids
S
i{ˆ θi} (Notice that the mechanism cannot dis-
tinguish bids coming from the same agent). The utility to agent i is the utility it receives
from allocations to any of its bids, minus the total net transfers.
Deﬁnition 5 A combinatorial auction is false-name-proof if it is the dominant strategy
of agent i to submit only a single bid, as {θi}.
It is known that the GVA is not false-name-proof for general agent valuation functions.
In fact, Yokoo et. al. (2002) show that this is true in any eﬃcient mechanism:
Theorem 2 (Yokoo, Sakurai, and Matsubara 2002) A combinatorial auction that is alloca-
tively eﬃcient will not be false-name-proof.
4 Intractability of VCG-based Auction Manipulation
In this subsection we formally deﬁne the manipulation problem for VCG-based mechanisms,
and prove it is NP-hard.
We focus ﬁrst on a special case of the general combinatorial auction problem, in which
bidders are single-minded:
Deﬁnition 6 A type vector θ is single-minded if for every agent i, there exists a bundle
of goods Si and number r such that the valuation function vi deﬁned by θ satisﬁes vi(Si) = r
if T ⊆ Si, and vi(Si) = 0 otherwise. We then denote the agent’s bid as a pair, (Si,r).
In other words, the agent only values a single bundle for a single amount, and gets no
additional or partial value from any other goods.
What we will do is consider the necessary properties of VCG-based auctions that will
allow us to say that their manipulation is hard.
Deﬁnition 7 An allocation algorithm k satisﬁes greedy optimality (“G-OPT”) iﬀ, when-
ever all bidders are single-minded3, it never allocates to a set of bids that is a proper subset
of the set allocated to by another valid allocation, and it never allocates goods to agents who
don’t request them.
Intuitively, G-OPT just ensures that the algorithm at the very least does not leave goods
unassigned (or assigned to agents who don’t want them) when other bids request them.
Claim 1 Any allocation algorithm can be modiﬁed to satisfy greedy optimality with at worst
a linear-time slowdown and no loss in eﬃciency.
3We state our assumptions with respect to the single-minded case, because that is all we require to prove
the results. Both this deﬁnition and the following one could be naturally extended to general types, but this
is not necessary for this paper.
6Proof: First, check to make sure all bidders are single-minded (if not, return the regular
allocation). Then, take the allocation and remove any goods assigned to an agent when those
goods were not in the agent’s desired bundle. Scan through the remaining bids, allocating to
any that are consistent with the current allocation. At the end, either all bids are allocated
to, or any remaining bids could not possibly be allocated to given the current allocation.
Deﬁnition 8 An allocation algorithm satisﬁes strong consumer sovereignty (“SCS”)
iﬀ whenever all bidders are single-minded, no single agent would receive more value from
receiving its bundle than the total value the algorithm achieves.
Generally, consumer sovereignty requires that there exists an amount an agent can bid
such that the algorithm will assign the desired bundle to that agent. Strong consumer
sovereignty simply makes that bid amount more speciﬁc—the value of the allocation achieved
without allocating to that bundle.
Claim 2 Any allocation algorithm can be modiﬁed to satisfy strong consumer sovereignty
with at worst a linear-time slowdown and no loss in eﬃciency.
Proof: First, verify that all bidders are single-minded. Take the allocation, and scan
through the remaining bids, and ﬁnd the one with the most value (break ties arbitrarily). If
this value is greater than the total value achieved by the original allocation, then alter the
allocation to allocate to that single bid (removing all conﬂicts).
Deﬁnition 9 The single-minded manipulation problem for a combinatorial auction
is, given (θ,i) (all single-minded), returning a bid ˆ θi = (ˆ Si, ˆ vi) that gives agent i at least
 additional units than what it would have received from being truthful in that auction, or
outputting “impossible” if no such manipulation exists.4
We can also deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 10 The general manipulation problem for a combinatorial auction is, given
(θ,i), returning a new type ˆ θi that gives agent i at least  additional units than what it
would have received from being truthful in that auction, or outputting “impossible” if no such
manipulation exists.
Theorem 3 Suppose the allocation algorithm of a combinatorial auction satisﬁes greedy
optimality and strong consumer sovereignty and runs in polynomial time. Then the single-
minded manipulation problem is NP-hard.
Corollary 1 Suppose the allocation algorithm of a combinatorial auction satisﬁes greedy
optimality and strong consumer sovereignty and runs in polynomial time. Then the general
manipulation problem is NP-hard.
4 is a parameter chosen to be suﬃciently smaller than the precision otherwise provided by the bidding
language. Speciﬁcally, choose  such that for all bid amounts b,b0, we have that b − b0 > .
7Proof of Corollary: Since this problem generalizes the single-minded case, it is only
harder.
To prove the theorem, we require the following fact:
Fact 1 (Lehmann, O’Callaghan, and Shoham 2002) The following problem (single-minded-
winner-determination) is NP-hard: given a single-minded type vector θ and a number
K, determining whether an allocation can achieve eﬃciency of K units, and outputting that
allocation if it exists.
Proof of Theorem: Suppose the single-minded manipulation problem could be solved in
polynomial time. We provide a solution to single-minded-winner-determination.
Denote θ as a vector ((S1,v1),...(Sn,vn)) where n is the number of agents. First, run
the allocation algorithm on θ. Let the eﬃciency of the result be x. If x ≥ K, then we are
done: output “yes” and return the allocation. Suppose otherwise, so K > x.
Denote the set of all (relevant) goods S =
S
i Si. Deﬁne θ0 = ((S1 ∪ {g1},v1),...,(Sn ∪
{gn},vn),(S,K − )), where each gi is a new unique good, and we have introduced a new
agent n + 1 that values the entire set of goods of the original auction at the value K − .
Run the polynomial-time algorithm for the manipulation problem on (θ0,n+1). Return the
same answer that this algorithm returns. If the answer is “yes,” then let the type vector of
the manipulation for agent n+1 be ˆ θ0
n+1. Obtain the allocation achieving K by running the
allocation algorithm on (θ−(n+1), ˆ θ0
n+1) and returning the allocation to players 1 through n.
We now prove the main reduction: θ has an allocation achieving K units of eﬃciency if
and only if agent n + 1 can achieve at least  units of manipulation in θ0.
First, however, a lemma:
Lemma 1 When run on θ0, the allocation algorithm will allocate S to agent n+1 (the new
agent), giving it utility K − x − .
Proof of Lemma: We assumed that the allocation algorithm satisﬁes strong consumer
sovereignty, and that the algorithm achieves x units of welfare when agent n+1’s bid is not
in the system. But we know that K > x, and thus K −  > x (since  is of arbitrarily small
precision), and thus it follows by SCS that agent n + 1 is allocated S.
Since no one else can be allocated to, agent n + 1’s payment is x units, and its utility is
K − x − .
Suppose that an allocation of θ can give K units of eﬃciency (call this allocation g∗(θ)).
Recall x is the eﬃciency of the allocation algorithm k(θ), and K > x. By the lemma we
know agent n+1 gets K−x− units of utility from being truthful. But then agent n+1 can
achieve K −x units of utility by forsaking its desired bundle and just bidding for the unique
goods of the agents that are not in allocation g∗ (and bidding high enough that the bid will
be taken—such a number exists by SCS). The payment to agent n + 1 is just K (eﬃciency
8for everyone else with it in the system) minus x (eﬃciency for everyone else without it). The
algorithm will achieve K units for everyone else with agent n+1 because the remaining bids
form the feasible allocation g∗, and so by G-OPT, the allocation algorithm will allocate to
them. Thus, agent n + 1 can manipulate to achieve an extra  unit of utility.
Suppose, on the other hand, that we know agent n+1 can manipulate to achieve  more
utility, so that it receives K − x units of utility. First, it is clear that this utility cannot
consist in it actually making its bid for S. If it did, then (1) it would get K− units of utility
and (2) all other agents would receive zero utility (because no other bid could possibly be
made). Since the other agents would get x without agent n+1, the most it could receive in
this way is the same K − x −  achieved before. But then all of its utility must come from
payment (i.e., it must be paid K − x units). Since x is the utility for everyone else without
agent n + 1, the allocation its manipulation induces must achieve K units of eﬃciency for
everyone else in this auction. Moreover, since the same allocation is possible in the original
(unique goods create no new conﬂicts), the same K units must have been achievable in the
original auction.
Nisan (2003) achieves an algorithm with a polynomially-bounded approximation ratio
for general combinatorial auctions.5 Combined with our theorem and the claims above, this
leads to the following corollary, a counterpoint to the negative result in Nisan & Ronen
(2000):
Corollary 2 There exists a tractable and hard-to-manipulate mechanism with a polynomially-
bounded approximation ratio.
5 Intractability of GVA False-Name Bid Manipulation
In this section we deﬁne the false-name manipulation problem and demonstrate that this
manipulation problem in the GVA is NP-hard.
Deﬁnition 11 The false-name-manipulation problem for a combinatorial auction is,
given a type vector for all agents θ and agent i, determining a set of bids {θi1,...θik} such
that when the auction operates on (θ−i,{θi1,...θik}), the resulting utility to agent i increases
by  units.
Theorem 4 The false-name-manipulation problem for the GVA is NP-hard (even when
there are only two agents).
Fact 2 (Garey and Johnson 1979) The following problem (exact-cover-by-three-sets)
is NP-hard: Given a universe X, |X| = 3q, and a collection C of 3-element subsets of X,
does there exist a subcollection of size q that partitions X?
5The algorithm eﬀectively works by ﬁnding sets Si for each bidder maximizing v(Si,θi)/|Si| and then
allocating those sets to each in decreasing order of v(Si,θi)/|Si|.
9Proof: We reduce from exact-cover-by-three-sets. Create two agents, 1 and 2. The
set of goods will be precisely the elements of X. Agent 1 has the following valuation function
θ1:
v1(S) =

q +  : S = X
0 : S 6= X
(where  is some arbitrary, small constant). Agent 2, alternatively, has the following valuation
function:
v2(S) =

   
   
v : |S| ≥ 4
1 : |S| ≤ 2
1 : |S| = 3,S ∈ C
2 : |S| = 3,S / ∈ C
(where v is some arbitrary number much larger than q). Clearly, the appropriate allocation
under truthful reporting is to give at least four elements to agent 2 and give nothing to agent
1. By strategyproofness there is no way for agent 1 to lie to achieve more than this zero
utility. However, with false-name bids this is sometimes possible. Speciﬁcally, agent 1 can
manipulate by false-name bids to achieve at least  units of utility if and only if there is a
partition of X through elements of C.
Suppose there is a partition of X, call it C0 ⊆ C. Then consider the following strategy for
agent 1: agent 1 takes on q identities, each of whom bids for only an exact subset Ci ∈ C0,
with any bid amount suﬃciently high to win (say, v + 1). Clearly, agent 1 will win all of
the goods. Moreover, each bidder will be charged exactly 1 unit, because if any individual
bidder would be removed from the system, agent 2 would get those three elements, which it
values only at 1 unit apiece. Thus, the total utility to agent 1 is  (bundle gives q + , but
it pays q).
Suppose, alternatively, that we have a false-name bid manipulation achieving  utility for
agent 1. Then we must demonstrate there is a partition of X using subsets from C. First,
some straightforward but necessary observations. Since all the transfers are nonnegative,
and since agent 1 only gets utility from the entire bundle, it can only improve its utility by
obtaining the entire bundle of goods. Also, agent 1 will gain nothing by submitting bids that
would not win—such bids would either have no eﬀect or would just increase its payments.
Moreover, if a bidder wins a certain subset, specifying that bidder’s valuations on any other
subset will have no, or only an adverse, eﬀect on agent 1’s total utility. Thus, we can reduce
the false-name bids of agent 1 to specifying a partition of X, with each identity bidding for
a single disjoint subset, and with the bid amount just some large number guaranteeing the
bid is made (notice that changing the size of the bid amount, given that the bid will be
made, will not aﬀect the agent’s utility). To reason about potential partitions, notice that
no identity can aﬀord to take a subset of size larger than 3, since it would have to pay v
(agent 2 would value that subset at v), which is already far more than agent 1’s valuation
10for the entire bundle. Moreover, every identity must pay at least 1 unit, since no matter
what the identity receives, agent 2 would value that bundle for at least that much. Thus,
there can be at most q identities that are allocated to, since otherwise agent 1 will pay more
than its value for the entire bundle. Given that |X| = 3q and that no identity can get more
than 3 goods, it follows that each identity must receive 3 distinct goods. But the only way
such a manipulation will succeed in not costing agent 1 more than its value is if each such
bid is charged 1 unit, and this happens if and only if each subset is a member of C. In such
a case, we have the partition as desired.
6 Discussion
Hardness of VCG-based Auction Manipulation: It is important at this stage to ask
what is driving our result that although strict truthfulness and reasonableness may be im-
possible, reasonableness and hardness of manipulation are certainly possible with tractable
mechanisms. In fact, the hardness is driven by the diﬃculty of the winner-determination
problem and the so-called “self-correcting” property of VCG-based mechanisms. Speciﬁcally,
it is an often noted property of VCG-based mechanisms that any potential manipulation al-
ways improves the eﬃciency of the allocation—i.e., if by manipulating an agent forces the
allocation from A to A0, then it must be the case that A0 has overall better welfare for all
agents than A did.
Thus, the reason that manipulation in these cases is hard is that the agents are ultimately
trying to solve the same problem as the allocation algorithm—trying to ﬁnd the allocation
best maximizing welfare for all agents. The nature of the reduction and the required assump-
tions are all just there to ensure that (1) any (as opposed to say, optimal) manipulation by
the agent will require solving a hard problem and (2) the allocation algorithm is suﬃciently
sophisticated (or “controllable”) to take advantage of the “hints” a manipulative agent would
provide.
Hardness of GVA False-name Manipulation: Unlike the hard-to-manipulate result
for an agent with a single identity, our false-name manipulation result does not depend on
the diﬃculty of the winner-determination problem. On the contrary, the result requires
that the winner-determination problem is solved optimally, and shows that in such a case,
manipulation is NP-hard. This is a drawback— with false-name bids, we (currently) must
settle for a mechanism that is intractable, allocatively eﬃcient, and hard to manipulate.
We leave as an open question whether it is possible to design a tractable, reasonable, and
hard-to-false-name-manipulate mechanism. Certainly, an agent is able to derive a substantial
amount of power when given false-name bids and a suboptimal allocation algorithm. For
instance, it is possible for an agent to create (through several false names) a situation where
the algorithm will be ineﬃcient, then create a new agent who ﬁxes this ineﬃciency (through
unique goods, like in the intractability result above), and get paid for the result.
116.1 Critique and Future Work
Mechanism design for bounded-rational agents is an important but diﬃcult endeavor. Many
negative results point to the complexity of game-theoretic solution concepts and suggest the
importance of ﬁnding a way to relax the assumption that agents will always play an exact
equilibrium. A new theory is required that can provide a normative approach for design with
respect to self-interested but bounded-rational agents. This is a diﬃcult problem, however,
because models of bounded-rationality are hard to formalize and do not allow ready analysis,
especially in equilibrium.
Our results are worst-case in nature: all we guarantee is that manipulation is hard in some
cases. Manipulation may, in general, remain possible for an agent. This issue is certainly
not unique to this work—the results of Conitzer & Sandholm (2002) have the same nature.
Yet, in a mechanism design community spoiled by the ironclad, “every-case” guarantees of
dominant strategy equilibrium, the diﬀerence is striking.
What we would really like is some statement like: “the dominant strategy equilib-
rium for polynomial-time bounded agents is truth revelation”. That is, whatever the other
(polynomial-time) agents are capable of reporting, given knowledge of the mechanism rules
any polynomial-time bounded agent will always do best by being truthful. O’Connell (2000)
has suggested some deﬁnitions of this form. Our current model invokes no equilibrium con-
cept, but instead adopts truth-revelation as a default strategy and shows that, whatever
other agents are doing (we need not assume they are polynomially-bounded or truthful), a
polynomially-bounded agent will not be able to manipulate every time such a manipulation
exists. Notice that agents are not reasoning about the bounded-rationality of other agents,
but merely supposed to fall-back on truth-revelation because manipulation is hard.
We believe that real progress will require a formal reintroduction of equilibrium con-
cepts, albeit across bounded-rational agents. In this vein, Rubinstein (1998) has consid-
ered the equilibrium across agents represented as ﬁnite-state machines with limited state.
Other work has modeled agents with cost-based models of computation (assumed common-
knowledge), but assumed that agents can perform optimal meta-deliberation which is itself
often intractable (Larson and Sandholm 2001). In our setting, it is not clear how a bounded-
rational equilibrium can be implemented when the strategy space for an agent is exponential
yet an agent has polynomial-time bounds. What section of the search space should that
polynomial-time bound be spent searching, and how might agents “coordinate” their rea-
soning with others?
7 Conclusions
To conclude, we have demonstrated two primary complexity results—the NP-hardness of
manipulating suboptimal and tractable VCG-based auctions and the NP-hardness of manip-
ulating the GVA using false-name bids. In the process, we suggested a model for sidestepping
12negative results in mechanism design—by relaxing strategyproofness to a type of “hardness-
of-manipulation.” Although the guarantee this latter notion provides is substantially weaker
than strategyproofness, the demands of practicality, in light of substantial negative results,
make it at least a necessary and somewhat comforting recourse.
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